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NOTES
DEDUCTION OF CONTESTED LIABILITIES: The Validity of
Certain Treasury Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code Section
461(f)-Poirier & McLane Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 570
(1975), rev'd, 547 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967
(1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

For some time accrual method taxpayers have been permitted,
in certain circumstances, to currently deduct amounts of liabilities
asserted against them but not yet precisely determined through
litigation or settlement. In what circumstances these deductions
should be permitted has consistently confounded courts and legal
writers concerned with the fair administration of the federal tax
laws.' This confusion was compounded when the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the case of Poirier & McLane Corp. v.
Commissioner.2
Under an early Supreme Court rule all such deductions had to
meet the "all events" test' before they could be allowed to offset
taxable income. This meant that until the fact and amount of the
liability had been definitively established, no such deduction would
be allowed. Contested liabilities generally could not meet this test
until litigation was concluded or final settlement had been made.
The Court of Claims adopted a rule which distinguished certain
fact situations and exempted them from the Supreme Court rule.
If the contested liability was paid by the party, then a deduction
could be taken even though neither the fact nor the precise amount
of the liability had been determined. This became known as the
Chestnut Rule' and was subsequently accepted by the Treasury
Department.'
When the Chestnut Rule reached the Supreme Court, it was
denied application and the "all events" test was reaffirmed.' Congress responded to this by expressly overruling the Supreme Court
case and effectively reinstating the Chestnut Rule by enacting Inter1
nal Revenue Code section 461(f).
REV. 149
1. See generally, Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 727 (1958).
(1949); Freeman, Tax Accrual Accounting for Contested Items, 56 MIcH. L.
(January
2. 63 T.C. 570 (1975), rev'd, 547 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1976), rehearing denied,
10, 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
3. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
4. Chestnut Sec. Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 574 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
5. G.C.M. 25298 (1947-2 C.B. 39).
6. United States v. Consolidated Edison, 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
7. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 461(f) reads:
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The promulgation of Treasury Department regulations designed to implement the new code section followed. Under these
regulations payment of the contested liability can be achieved, at
least for purposes of being entitled to a deduction, by placing an
amount beyond the taxpayer's control, usually in a trust or escrow
"pursuant to a written agreement (among the escrowee or trustee,
the taxpayer, and the person who is asserting the liability) "8
The issue in Potner concerned the validity of this regulation.
The requirement that the trust be "among" the litigating parties
was interpreted to mean that both parties must sign the written
agreement. Poirier challenged this on the grounds that this requirement unduly restricted the scope of section 461(f) and was therefore
contrary to congressional intent.
In order to understand the problem presented by Potner it is
necessary to begin with a discussion of the cases which led to the
conflicting theories and reasoning the courts had previously used in
resolving the proper treatment of contested liabilities. This will be
followed by a brief explanation of the congressional action and ad(f)

CONTESTED LIABILITIES. -If-

(i) the taxpayer contests an asserted liability
(2) the taxpayer transfers money or other property to provide for the satisfaction
of the asserted liability,
(3) the contest with respect to the asserted liability exists after the time of the
transfer, and
(4) but for the fact that the asserted liability is contested, deduction would be
allowed for the taxable year of the transfer (or for an earlier taxable year),
then the deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year of the transfer. This subsection
shall not apply in respect of the deduction for income, war profits, and excess profits
taxes imposed by the authority of any foreign country or possession of the United
States.
Enacted as Public Law 88-272, § 223(a)(1), commonly known as the Tax Reform Act of 1964.
8. The full text of Treasury Regulation 1.461-2(c)(1) reads:
In general. A taxpayer may provide for the satisfaction of an asserted liability by
transferring money or other property beyond his control (i) to the person who is asserting the liability, (ii) to an escrowee or trustee pursuant to written agreement (among
the escrowee or trustee, the taxpayer, and the person who is asserting the liability) that
the money or other property be delivered in accordance with the settlement of the
contest, or (iii) to an escrowee or trustee pursuant to an order of the United States,
any State or political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of the
foregoing, or court that the money or other property be delivered in accordance with
the settlement of the contest. A taxpayer may also provide for the satisfaction of an
asserted liability by transferring money or other property beyond his control to court
bond to guarantee payment of the
with jurisdiction over the contest. Purchasing
asserted liability, an entry on the taxpayer books of account, and transfer to an
account which is within the control of the taxpayer are not transfers to provide for the
satisfaction of an asserted liability. In order for the money or other property to be
beyond the control of taxpayer, the taxpayer must relinquish all authority over such
money or other property.
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ministrative reaction to the judicial determination. Focus will then
turn to the presentation of the case before the Tax Court and Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.
II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the course of carrying on its construction business' Poirier &
McLane Corporation, which utilized the accrual method of account
ing based on a calendar year, was alleged to have damaged property
adjacent to its work sites. In 1960 the owners of this property
brought aggregate claims for the negligence and trespass in excess
of $14,781,000. Poirier & McLane was notified by its insurance car
rier that its policies did not cover the claims for trespass, but that
the carrier would defend against all of the claims due to their potential partial liability for negligence.
Realizing the possibility of uninsured liability for trespass, the
taxpayer established a trust in December, 1964, on advice of its
counsel, the insurance carrier, and its accountant, in the sum of
$1,100,000 The trust agreement specifically provided that the funds
were to be used "for the sole purpose of the payment of the obligations of the Settlor" arising from these named suits.' " The trust
9. Poirier & McLane Corporation was engaged in building highways, viaducts, and
tunnels. Poirier had entered into two separate contracts in 1958, one with the Borough of
Brooklyn, New York, and one with the State of New York. In both contracts taxpayer was
required to hold the respective government party harmless from all damage claims resulting
from the work performed under the contracts.
10. The relevant provisions of the trust agreement, as quoted by the Tax Court were:
2. The principle and all accumulated interest and earnings shall be held by the
Trustee for the sole purpose of the payment of the obligations of the Settlor which may
arise out of litigation pending against the Settlor as a result of work performed by it
in the construction of the Spambrook Parkway in the county of Westchester, State of
New York and in the DeKalb Avenue subway reconstruction in the Borough of Brooklyn, County of Kings wherein judgments are demanded against the Settlor and others
for damages alleged to have been sustained by the owners and operators of properties
adjacent to the places at which the work was performed. The claims and suits to which
this agreement refers are those brought against POIRIER & McLANE CORPORATION by
[herein are named the eight plaintiffs in the various state court actions].
3. The Trustee shall make such payments out of the corpus of the trust as are
required to satisfy and discharge the obligation and responsibility of the Settlor to the
plaintiffs or claimants in such litigation, whether by settlement or by judgment and
to obtain funds for such purpose the Trustee may sell such securities invested in
accordance with Paragraph 1. hereof.
4. A request by the Settlor for the issuance of check or checks payable to
plaintiff or claimant shall be sufficient to empower the Trustee to make the payment.
5. The Trustee shall deliver to the Settlor the balance of the fund remaining after
the disposition of the claims on the statement of the Settlor that the claims, for the
satisfaction of which this transfer has been made, have been determined and disposed
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agreement was neither participated in nor signed by any of the
parties asserting the liabilities. Consequently these parties had no
knowledge whatever regarding this trust.
Poirier & McLane was naturally interested in lowering its tax
liability and in order to do this sought a deduction from taxable
income in the amount of the sum placed in trust. Relying on the
newly enacted Internal Revenue Code section 461(f) " the taxpayer
took this deduction on its 1964 federal income tax return.
In September 1969, the claims were effectively settled and in
November of the same year the trust principal was discharged to the
taxpayer 11When Poirier & McLane s 1964 return was audited the
Commissioner determined that in establishing the trust the tax
payer had failed to comply with all of the relevant regulations and
disallowed the deduction. The taxpayer claimed that the regulations with which it had not complied added requirements not contemplated by Congress in enacting section 461(f) and therefore the
regulations were invalid. Poirier & McLane appealed to the Tax
Court for relief.

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court Rule

The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in United States
v Anderson. 3 A munitions tax had been levied for which the tax
payer was liable on profits from 1916 sales. The tax became due and
was paid in 1917 and the taxpayer deducted this amount from its
1917 income. The Court ruled that the amount should have been
deducted in 1916 since "all events" which fixed the amount due
transpired in that year " Both the fact and precise amount of the
liability were settled in 1916.
13. This trust has been executed and delivered pursuant to the provisions of
Section 461-f of the 1964 Revenue Act, in the State of New York and it shall be
governed by the laws of that state.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 570, 572-73 (1975).
Poirier & McLane Corp.
11. See note 7 supra.
12. The various trials resulted only in findings of negligence, for which the taxpayer was
insured, with damages held at $11,600. In February, 1971, further litigation concerning interest resulted in an increase of the judgement to $14,204. The Commissioner argued continually
that litigation continued past the time that the trust was discharged. See note 76 tnfru. The
amount discharged to petitioner included interest on the trust fund and deductions for trustee
fees.
13. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
tax does not accrue until
14. In
technical legal sense it may be argued that
it has been assessed and becomes due, but it is also true that in advance of assessment
of tax, all the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the
liability of the taxpayer to pay it.
Id. at 441.
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The "all events" test was affirmed years later in Dixie Pine
Products v. Commissioner.15 An assessed tax was never paid but was
accrued on the taxpayer's books. The Court ruled that the "all
6
events" test had not been met and denied the deduction." Here, the
precise amount of the liability was certain, but not the fact that it
would ever have to be paid.
7
In Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner the taxpayer was
liable for a processing tax. It sued to prevent collection and deposited the accrued taxes with the court. Judgment was rendered for
the taxpayer in 1936, but the accrued taxes were deducted by petitioner on its 1935 tax return. Citing Dixie Pine, the Court said,
"[A] taxpayer may not accrue an expense the amount of which is
unsettled or the liability for which is contingent, and this principle
is fully applicable to a tax, liability for which the taxpayer denies,
and payment whereof he is contesting."'" Since the taxpayer
"denied liability for, and failed to pay, the tax during the taxable
year""9 no liability had accrued.
B.

The Chestnut Rule

In 1945 the Court of Claims was presented with Chestnut Securities Co. v. United States.2 0 The court took special note of the
words "failed to pay" from Security Flour Mills and used them to
distinguish Chestnut in view of the fact that Chestnut Securities
15. 320 U.S. 516 (1944). Taxpayer had been assessed a gasoline tax in 1936 on a solvent
it produced. It initiated suit to obtain a permanent injunction to prevent collection of the
tax, but continued to enter the tax as an accrued liability on its books. The tax was never
paid and the permanent injunction was issued in 1938.
16. [Aill the events must occur in that year which fix the amount and the fact
of the taxpayer's liability for items of indebtedness deducted though not paid; [citing
Anderson] and this cannot be the case where the liability is contingent and is contested by the taxpayer [citing Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 450-51
(1930)].
320 U.S. at 519.
17. 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
18. Id. at 284.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. 62 F. Supp. 574 (Ct. Cl. 1945). An accrual method taxpayer contested a state tax,
paid the tax to arrest interest and penalties in 1940, and deducted the amount paid on its
1940 federal income tax return. The Commissioner claimed that the deduction had not
accrued until litigation had terminated in 1942. The Court of Claims held for the taxpayer
stating:
One is not entitled to accrue a debt or other liability which is asserted against him
but which he disputes and litigates, until the litigation is concluded. But if a liability
is asserted against him and he pays it, though under protest, and though he promptly
begins litigation to get the money back, the status of the liability is that it has been
discharged by payment. . . . Accrual, from the debtor's standpoint, precedes payment, and does not survive it.
62 F. Supp. at 576.
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had paid their disputed taxes. The Court of Claims indicated that
the words "failed to pay" were an integral part of the
rule stated
by the Supreme Court, and this difference in fact situations
between
Security Flour Mills and Chestnut Securities was sufficient
basis for
declaring a different rule. If a liability is asserted against
a taxpayer
and he pays it, though under protest, and though he promptly
begins litigation to get the money back, the status of the liability
is
that it has been discharged by payment. 2', There is no specific
language in Dixie Pine, Anderson, or Security Flour Mills which
makes
the Court of'Claims' reasoning invalid.
It was reasonable for the Court of Claims to believe that
the
phrase "failed to pay" had the significance the court
gave it.
"Accrue" means "to come into existence as a legally enforceable
claim."22 The asserted liability, if it accrued at all, i.e., came
into
existence as a definite liability, would be immediately discharged
since it had already been paid. The effective result would,
by the
court's reasoning, be cash method treatment for a disbursement
by
an accrual method taxpayer.
Ten years later, in the case entitled Consolidated Edison
v.
United States23 the Court of Claims refined its earlier rule
by creating a two part test. They emphasized that payment alone
was not
sufficient. They noted the additional requirement that the
liability
would otherwise have had to accrue in that year.2 4 The court
did not
want taxpayers to merely select a year in which to take the
deduction.
C.

The Refutation of the Chestnut Rule.
Having lost in the Court of Claims, the taxpayer
in
Consolidated Edison I took the identical issue, but from
a different
taxable year, to the federal district court.2 5 After receiving
another
21. See note 20 supra.
22. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1975).
23. 135 F. Supp. 881 (Ct. Cl. 1955) [hereinafter referred
to as Consolidated Edison 11.
Consolidated Edison brought suit in the Court of Claims
to recover a deficiency assessment
for property taxes paid for the tax years 1938, 1939, and 1941.
The Commissioner here argued
the position it had opposed in Chestnut Securities. In fact,
the Treasury Department had
since acquiesced in the Chestnut Rule. See note 5 supra.
The court agreed with the Commissioner, followed the precedent of Chestnut Securities, and
held for the Commissioner.
24. What we have said does not mean that the mere payment
of an item accrues
that item, but rather we hold that payment of an item
which is otherwise accruable
in the taxable year accrues the item even though payment
is made under protest and
even though litigation is started within the taxable year
to obtain repayment.
135 F. Supp. at 885.
25. Congress has created three separate courts of original
jurisdiction for the resolution
of tax issues, namely, the Court of Claims, where review
may be had only on certiorari by
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6
adverse judgment, the taxpayer appealed to the circuit court."
The circuit court reversed, holding for the taxpayer" using reasoning contrary to that of the Court of Claims."
9
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying chiefly on its earlier
3
decisions of Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, Dixie Pine
3 ' and United States v. Anderson.3 As
Products v. Commissioner,
the Supreme Court; the federal district court, where review may be had by the circuit court;
E.
and the Tax Court, where review may also be had by the circuit court. See generally
As
(1976).
62-66
POLICIES
AND
PRINCIPLES
TAXATION
INCOME
FEDERAL
GRAETZ,
M.
&
GRISWOLD
to
noted therein, much confusion arises due to the fact that none of the courts are compelled
in the
rules
Conflicting
courts.
sister
of
decisions
the
to
decisis
stare
of
doctrine
the
apply
is a
various courts are not only possible, they are common. The rule under discussion here
the
prime example. For a fuller discussion of this topic taken from the present case, see
1960).
Cir.
(2d
152
F.2d
279
States,
United
v.
Edison
majority opinion in Consolidated
26. This is where many researchers become confused. This confusion is due to the fact
that the same taxpayer, Consolidated Edison, after losing in the Court of Claims, immediately instituted suit in the federal district court raising precisely the identical issue except
that it concerned the tax year 1951. See note 25 supra. The district court followed the rule
resupported by the Court of Claims and held for the Commissioner. The Second Circuit
Consolidated
refund.
taxpayer's
the
allowed
and
Rule,
Chestnut
the
negating
thus
versed,
Edison v. United States, 279 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1960). It was this case which was affirmed by
effort
the Supreme Court, 366 U.S. 380 (1961), and which prompted congressional action in an
infra.
37-42
notes
accompanying
text
See
to reinstate the Chestnut Rule in effect.
The facts and proceedings have become so confusing that many authorities have incorof
rectly stated them. Shepard's Citations says that the Second Circuit reversed the Court
Claims in Consolidated Edison I. SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS, FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT step in the
FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS-COURT OF CLAIMS 471 (1969). This is not even a proper
state
appeals process. It was perhaps this error which prompted Professor Michael Oshatz to
correct
the
states
Oshatz
case.
first
their
argued
successfully
had
Edison
Consolidated
that
holding of the Court of Claims, but mistakenly states that Consolidated Edison was arguing
INST.
that position. Oshatz, Accrual & Deduction of Contested and Contingent Liabilities, 26
OF FED. TAX. 747, 755 (1968).
To alleviate this confusion in the present note, the Court of Claims decision will be
will
referred to as ConsolidatedEdison I and the later suit which started in the district court
be referred to as Consolidated Edison II with the appropriate level of litigation indicated.
27. Consolidated Edison v. United States, 279 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1960). See note 25
supra.
af28. The court's reasoning was followed by the Supreme Court when the case was
firmed there. Since the Supreme Court's reasoning is fully discussed in the text following,
discussion of the opinion is deferred.
29. In its decision the Supreme Court admitted confusion with the opinion of the Court
of Claims in ConsolidatedEdison I. Some confusion is understandable. An initial reading of
Consolidated Edison I has the reader wondering how the taxpayer clearly lost on the merits,
yet received what appeared to be a full refund. The court noted that the parties had stipulated
the accounting of damages. Consequently, insufficient facts appear in the report to allow an
understanding of how the award was computed. Despite this, the rule of law was clearly stated
and the Court found more fault than was necessary.
30. 321 U.S. 281 (1944) (expense does not accrue if liability is uncertain and contingent). See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
31. 320 U.S. 516 (1944) ("all events" have-not occurred if liability is uncertain and
contingent). See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
32. 269 U.S. 422 (1926) (adoption of "all events" test). See notes 13 & 14 supra.
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noted, :':' the Court of Claims relied on the phrase "failed to pay"
from Security Flour Mills to distinguish Chestnut Securities. In
Consolidated Edison H the Supreme Court stated that too much
emphasis had been placed on that phrase and, as a result, "the
[c]ourt's judgment was contrary to its rule. ' '31 To the Supreme
Court, finality of fact and degree of liability were the key considerations. The ultimate "black letter law" which emanated from the
Court following ConsolidatedEdison I was that until litigation settled the precise nature and extent of the liability, the accrual of the
disbursement has not met the "all events" test and is not deductible.35
The Court of Claims and the Supreme Court were both supporting valid tax policies which conflict on this issue. The Supreme
Court felt that strict adherence to the "all events" test was paramount. The Court of Claims was trying to enforce the "matching
principle ' 3 to the extent possible. The Supreme Court failed to
identify and deal with this conflict, and as a result its reasoning for
applying the one doctrine rather than the other remains ambiguous.
D.

Congressionaland Administrative Reaction.
At this point Congress took note of the problem by enacting
section 461(f) 37 of the Internal Revenue Code, making it explicit that
the rule of Consolidated Edison II was unacceptable in the given
fact situation.3 Although Congress acknowledged the validity of
"the legal doctrine laid down" therein,'3 its concern was for the
unfortunate taxpayer who was forced to restrict his cash flow in the
face of potential liability, yet be denied any tax break on the encumbered sum."' Section 461(f) was designed to support the Chestnut
Rule exception" to the "all events" test." When the issue concerns
33. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
34. Consolidated Edison v. United States, 366 U.S. 380, 390 (1961).
35. Id. at 391.
36. The matching principle is the theory of taxation which states that
deductions
should be matched with the income that the expenses generated. This is the
underlying
reason for depreciation, for example, and is especially important in light of the
annual taxing
period. See generally GRISWOLD, supra note 25, at 466-628.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1773.
39. Id.
40. Id. § (c).
41. The language used by Congress expressed that they were not merely reinstating
the
Chestnut Rule, but using the underlying policy to create a rule with a much
broader application. Id. at 1912. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
42. This rule was subsequently accepted by the Treasury Department. See
notes 5 &
23 supra.
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contested liabilities Congress clearly prefers the "matching principle" over the "all events" test.
Following the enactment of these reforms, the Treasury Department promulgated Treasury Regulation section 1.461-2, filed November 23, 1964.11 As a result of the filing of this interpretative regulation,4 the stage was finally set for Poirier & McLane Corp. v.
Commissioner.'
IV.

RESPONSE OF THE COURTS

An examination of the briefs presented to the court shows precisely how the issues were developed and framed by the respective
parties in Poirier.The taxpayer's brief before the Tax Court argued
centrally that Treasury Regulation 1.461-2(c)(1) is invalid because
it is not in harmony with the code section it is intended to interpret. " The general rule on invalidity is that the Treasury may not
make an arbitrary or unreasonable regulation, nor can it restrict or
enlarge the scope of a statute, supply a presumed omission, create
an exemption, limit any rights thereunder, or nullify a prior judicial
47
construction of the statute.
Reg. 9798, 9800 (1964).
43. The regulation first appeared in its proposed form in 29 Fed.
liability must agree to the
the
asserting
person
the
that
states
plainly
there
language
The
is not known why the provision
establishment of the trust. The language there was clear and it
See note 8 supra for the
was changed to a parenthetical using the ambiguous word "among."
text of Treas. Reg. 1.461-2(c)(1).
two types of regulations. At
44. The Treasury Department is empowered to prescribe
is to be implemented by
section
I.R.C.
given
a
that
states
times Congress expressly
"regulations as may be necessary or appropriate." Such regulations are generally given the
has also given the Treasury
force of law and are known as legislative regulations. Congress
the I.R.C. under § 7805(a).
of
part
any
for
Department general power to make regulations
are considered interpretive
section
this
under
promulgated
Regulations
infra.
62
note
See
if they have attained
especially
courts,
the
by
weight
regulations and are given substantial
supra note 25, at 45-47.
the "sanctity of law." See notes 47-50 infra. See generally GIUSWOLD,
Distinction: SeSee also Comment, Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative
REv. 421 (1976).
N.C.L.
54
Procedures,
mantical Feinting with an Exception to Rulemaking
(January
denied,
rehearing
1976),
Cir.
(2d
161
F.2d
547
rev'd,
(1975),
45. 63 T.C. 570
10, 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
see note 8 supra.
46. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8. For the text of regulation 1.461-2(c)(1),
escrowee or trusthe
"among
parenthetical
the
was
That portion which was questioned here
earlier, see text follownoted
As
liability."
asserting
is
who
person
the
and
taxpayer,
the
tee,
Poirier & McLane were parties
ing note 10 supra, none of the parties asserting liability against
to the trust agreement.
and cases cited therein.
47. 1 MERTEN'S LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 3.21, at 46-47 (1974)
v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1883),
The most cited early authority for this proposition is Morrill
Chief Justice Waite stated, "The
in which the Court was construing a Treasury Regulation.
amend a revenue law. All he can
or
alter
Secretary of the Treasury cannot by his regulations
Congress has enacted." 106
what
effect
into
carry
to
proceeding
of
mode
the
do is to regulate
297 U.S. 129
Commissioner,
v.
Co.
Equipment
U.S. at 467. See also Manhattan General
(1936).
728
U.S.
297
denied,
rehearing
(1936),
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Taxpayer's counsel relied on the fact that the regulation placed
burdens on the taxpayer which were not required by the statute, and
that it was therefore "unreasonable, arbitrary, and invalid."" Counsel further argued that it had utilized the statute soon after its
enactment and less than one month after the regulation had been
filed. The new regulation had not, consequently, "attained the
sanctity of law.""4
Evidence of legislative intent was gleaned from several sources.
Clearly Congress intended that section 461(f) would be broadly applied.
The new subsection (f) is not limited to an asserted liability for
taxes, but applies to any asserted liability where the requirements of
the new subsection (f) are met. A taxpayer may provide for the satisfaction of an asserted liability by transferring money or other property to the person who is asserting the liability, or by a transfer to an
escrow agent provided that the money or other property is beyond the
control of the taxpayer. 0
The underlying policy was the "matching principle"'" and the
new law was to apply "even though the liability is still being contested either as to amount or as to the item itself. ' 52 It is also clear
that the goal was to allow the deduction in a year prior to that of
final settlement as long as the payment is actually made in the year
the deduction is taken. 53 The legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to reinstate the policy behind the Chestnut Rule, give
the rule a much broader application than it previously had,54 and
assure that the "all events" test would no longer be applied to
contested liabilities.
Another of the taxpayer's arguments was based on policies concerning litigation strategy. The thrust of this argument is that if the
person asserting the liability must also be made a party to the trust,
48. Brief for Petitioner at 10.
49. Id. at 59. The basic premise of this doctrine is that Congress is aware
of how statutes
are being regulated and if it was not felt that such regulation was in harmony
with congressional intent, then a new statute would be enacted to more explicitly state
the original intent.
Therefore a regulation can eventually receive repeated tacit approval from
Congress and
thereby attain the sanctity of law. See generally Helvering v. Winmill, 305
U.S. 79 (1938); 1
MERTEN'S LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION §§ 3.20-3.24 (1974) and cases
cited therein.
50. S. SuPP. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 44, reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1913.
51. See note 36 supra.
52. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1773. Note how the language is directly contrary to that used
by the Supreme
Court in Consolidated Edison II. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
53. See 110 Cong. Rec. 1454, 3517 (Senate debates), 3562, 3565 (House debate)
(1963).
54. See note 41 supra.
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the bargaining power of the defending taxpayer would be effectively
destroyed because the trust fund could be used by the plaintiff as
prima facie evidence of what the defendant reasonably believes the
ultimate extent of his liability to be. Other factors which could be
used as strategic maneuvers detrimental to the defendant include
the possibility that the asserting party would be in a position to
demand unfair terms in the trust or would be able to force the
defendant to settle simply by refusing to sign the trust. The inability of the taxpayer to utilize the deduction could result in tax liabilities that economically would mandate settlement of even tenuous
claims."
The Commissioner countered these arguments by maintaining
that the deduction could not be allowed under Internal Revenue
Code section 461(a) 6 because "all events" had not occurred and
5
noted that Regulation 1.461-1(a)(3) " requires the,"all events" test.
This argument ignores the following facts: (1) that Congress made
section 461(f) an exception to the "all events" test; (2)58that the
taxpayer was claiming under section 461(f), not 461(a); and (3)
that Regulation 1.461-1(a)(2) specifically refers taxpayers to Regulation 1.461-2 for treatment of contested liabilities. The only case
cited by the Commissioner which bears directly on section 461(f)
is Turtle Wax, Inc.,6 0 one of the first cases to invoke the new section.
The problem with using this case is that the only relevant proposition for which the case can be cited is that the new legislation
reversed the Supreme Court's rule in Consolidated Edison II and
that if the funds were
55. Brief for Petitioner at 63-67. Other policies include the point
the transferor
contest,
the
lost
transferor
the
and
liability
asserting
party
the
transferred to
are involved,
taxes
where
situations
unlike
fund,
might have a difficult time recovering the
in question was pending,
litigation
the
where
law,
State
York
New
under
that
and further
This last argument would
deposits with the court are not allowed except in contract disputes.
not necessarily apply in every jurisdiction.
deduction or credit allowed
56. The text of I.R.C. § 461(a) reads: "The amount of any
proper taxable year under
the
is
by this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which
income."
taxable
computing
in
used
the method of accounting
57. The text of Regulation 1.461-1(a)(2) reads in part:
for the taxable
Under an accrual method of accounting, an expense is deductible
liability and
the
of
fact
the
determine
which
year in which all events have occurred
accuracy. . . . While no
reasonable
with
determined
be
can
thereof
amount
the
not occurred which
accrual shall be made in any case in which all of the events have
which has been incurred
fix the liability, the fact that the exact amount of the liability
year of such part
cannot be determined will not prevent the accrual within the taxable
the case of certain
thereof as can be computed with reasonable accuracy. . . . In
or other property
contested liabilities in respect of which a taxpayer transfers money
1.461-2.
to provide for the satisfaction of the contested liability, see §
58. See notes 7 & 57 supra.
59. Brief for Respondent at 11.
60. 43 T.C. 460 (1965).
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reinstated the Chestnut Rule.6 1 Such a proposition does nothing to
further the Commissioner's argument.
It was not until submission of the reply brief that the Commissioner took a tenable position by arguing that the regulation is a
valid exercise of authority under Internal Revenue Code section
78052 and is intended to implement the stated legislative policy
that the funds be placed beyond the taxpayer's control. 3 The Commissioner took the position that the language of the trust agreement64 allows the taxpayer to maintain control over the fund. The
issue is thus framed in terms of what constitutes "beyond the control" of the taxpayer, which is precisely the issue to which the Tax
Court addressed itself.
The majority of the court held that the trust was valid under
New York law."5 Regarding the regulation the court stated:
In these circumstances, the trust agreement was "among the
• . . trustee, the taxpayer, and the person[s] who . . . [were] as-

serting the liability" to the same extent as it would have been had
the claimant-beneficiaries signed the instrument. The imprecise language of the regulation-that the agreement is to be "among" the
stated parties-was no doubt adopted in order to include situations
like this one where the signatures of the claimant-beneficiaries would
add nothing.
We hold that the trust agreement complies with the provisions
of section 461(f) and of section 1.461-2 (c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Al61. Id. at 466. Although the Tax Court spoke of reinstating the Chestnut
Rule, the rule
stated by Congress is intended to be much broader than the specific Chestnut
Rule. See note
41 supra.
62. The text of I.R.C. § 7805(a) reads:
AUTHORIZATION-Except where such authority is expressly given by
this title
to any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department,
the
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of this
title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any
alteration
of law in relation to internal revenue.
63. Reply Brief for Respondent at 9.
64. See note 10 supra.
65. Petitioner and respondent were both requested to submit supplemental
briefs analyzing the trust agreement and the control which the taxpayer could have
exercised over the
corpus. Since this involves in-depth analysis of New York trust law, it is beyond
the scope of
this note. See In re Sweeny's Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 927, 155 Misc. 461 (1935);
Prudence Co. v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 262 N.Y.S. 311, 237 App. Div. 595 (1933);
In re George's
Estate, 3 N.Y.S. 426 (1889); all of which held that secret trusts created irrevocable
rights in
the beneficiaries. Respondent relied chiefly on the language of paragraph
five of the trust.
See note 10 supra. This neglects the fact that to exercise this right unless
and until the claims
had been settled would be fraud on the part of the settlor. Further, paragraph
four of the trust
agreement requires checks made "payable to a plaintiff or claimant," not
to the settlor. The
Tax Court noted this point, 63 T.C. at 577. See BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 169,
172 (2d
ed. 1965); I Scorr, TRusTs § 36 (3d ed. 1967); 2 RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
§ 330 (1959).
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lowance of the deduction will serve the congressional objective of
matching deductions with taxable receipts to the extent practicable."
regulaThe court seemed to follow the rule that in interpreting
tions a court will ordinarily avoid a construction which raises doubts
as to its validity. 7 The concurrence was swayed by the taxpayer's
policy arguments regarding the taxpayer's loss of bargaining power
if the plaintiff's signature were required on the trust, and advocated
ruling that portion of section 1.461-2 (c)(1) invalid.
The dissent argued the plain meaning" of the word "among"
and maintained that the door would now be opened to large scale
tax avoidance by allowing secret trusts to be established at the
taxpayer's whim. 9 This argument ignores the fact that the existence
of an asserted liability is part of the first requisite of a section 461(f)
deduction, and that ultimately the liability will either have to be
paid, in which case the congressionally mandated "matching princito the
ple" will have been followed, or the amount will be returned
7" Either way
income.
gross
his
taxpayer and included once again in
the taxpayer has the use of the income of the corpus or, as in Turtle
Wax, Inc.,7" he collects interest from the party who had asserted the
72
liability and had been paid.
Judge Hall's dissent is defended on policy grounds by one au73
thority, Professor Jerome Horvitz. Considering the tax accounting
aspects, Professor Horvitz seems concerned that the tax court holding could allow a crafty taxpayer to materially distort his income
to
in any given year. He suggests that if the tax court rule were
stand, Congress would be well advised to provide that the sum
deposited under section 461(f) be reasonably comensurate with the
66. Poirier & McLane Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. at 581.
and cases cited therein.
67. 1 MERTEN'S LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 3.21 at 47 (1974),
simply that the words
means
interpretation
statutory
of
68. The plain meaning rule
reading. Id. § 3.14.
used will be given their common meaning as understood by any reasonable
584.
at
69. 63 T.C.
70. Except as excluded under I.R.C. § 111.
71. Turtle Wax, Inc., 43 T.C. 460 (1965).
it, on the question of
72. Section 461(f) is silent, as is the legislative history behind
fund be beyond the
the
that
requirement
the
is
concern
congressional
key
interest. The
control, he will still
releases
taxpayer
the
how
of
taxpayer's control. It seems that regardless
some control over the
indicate
would
interest
of
Receipt
corpus.
the
on
interest
to
entitled
be
of this intent would be that
fund, but was allowed in Turtle Wax. Perhaps a proper reading
disposition of the corpus. The
the taxpayer is required to release all control over the ultimate
interest then becomes irrelevant in this context.
has Tax Planning
73. Horvitz, Creating a Trust to "Pay" Contested Liabilities
1975,
Developments:
Tax
Income
Federal
Briner,
see,
But
(1976).
14
TAX.
Potential, 44 J. OF
that
basis
the
on
majority
the
with
agrees
9 AKRON L. REV. 411 (1976), where the author
having the settlor admit
to
tantamount
be
would
trust
the
to
party
a
claimant
making the
liability. 9 AKRON L. REV. at 447.
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probable liability of the taxpayer.74 He agreed with Judge Hall that
the regulation as it stands provides that safeguard.
The Second Circuit also agreed with Judge Hall's dissent and
reversed the Tax Court. On appeal the Commissioner conceded that
the trust was valid,75 but argued that under such a trust the settlor
is the ultimate beneficiary and therefore has not relinquished full
control.76 The taxpayer countered that no express reservation of a
right to revoke was made and therefore all control had been relinquished.7 7 This is further supported by the fact that the trustee
required additional proof that no claims would arise from the litigation, thus indicating that it was the trustee's understanding that
petitioner was a reversioner and not a principal beneficiary."
The majority in the Second Circuit based its arguments on :(1)
legislative history which reinstated "a narrow exception to the general rule"" of the "all events" test; (2) the fact that the "timing and
amount of such transfers may still be entirely within the discretion
of the taxpayer"8 0 and "Poirier & McLane has failed to offer any
reason to regard 1964 as the year its liability accrued";8" (3) Congress' intention to limit the exception to cases which fix "the fact
and amount of the liability in a single taxable year";8 2 and (4) the
"strong presumption in favor of the validity of Treasury
Regulations. " 83
These arguments are not persuasive. It may be conceded that
the fact situation conceived by Congress is narrowly defined, but the
statutory language indicates that a broad application to many taxpayers was intended. In fact, it can easily be argued that this use
of the "matching principle" is no more an exception to the "all
events" test than the "all events" test is an exception to the
"matching principle." Both are basic premises
of the federal tax
structure and Congress made clear its intent to allow the "matching
principle" to apply pro tanto to this type of fact situation.
74. Horvitz, supra note 73, at 17.
75. The Tax Court was unanimous on this point.
76. The Commissioner also noted that even though the trust was discharged to the
taxpayer in November, 1969, litigation continued until April, 1972 regarding the
precise
amount of damages. Brief for Appellant at 21. This argument ignores the fact that
the
continuing litigation was solely for the determination of interest on the liability for negligence
for which the taxpayer was fully insured. Brief for Appellee at 23-24.
77. Brief for Appellee at 15.
78. Id.at 16-17.
79. 547 F.2d at 164.
80. Id. at 165.
81. Id. at 166.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 167 citing Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
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The court's second contention does point out the one weakness
in section 461(f). 4 It is difficult to understand, however, how the
taxpayer could have established the trust prior to 1964. Although
the claims against the taxpayer were filed four years earlier, section
461(f) was not enacted until 1964. The taxpayer, on advice of its
counsel, merely took advantage of a new law that appeared to have
85
been designed for its benefit. Despite the language of the regulation, the taxpayer relied on the specific language of the statute.
Congress could not have expected that every 461(f) trust would be
established in the same year that the income from the activity
which generated the cause of action was earned. Allowing such a
trust and the consequent deduction will match income with expenses as nearly as possible, and certainly much more closely than if
the "all events" test applied.
The court's third contention was stated in terms of "taxable
events." The claim was that unless the fact and amount of liability
8
are established there has been no taxable event. " The court seems
to have forgotten what they had just stated, that Connress intended
section 461(f) to allow accrual taxpayers to treat contested liabilities
8
as two separate taxable events. 1 If the requirement stands that the
fact and amount of contested liabilities be fixed in a single taxable
year, then the court has effectively returned to the8 "all events"
case.
standard from the second Consolidated Edison
The court's final contention that there exists a strong presump-9
tion in favor of the validity of Treasury regulations is settled law.
Frequently there is a balancing of policies involved in such a determination and doubts should fall in favor of the Treasury." It is not
clear here that such a balancing resulis in a close judgment. As
84. See Horvitz, supra note 73, at 16.
place. It was
85. Timing, it seems, was not of primary concern to Congress in the first
after the facts
surely recognized that liabilities are often not asserted until several years
for an earlier taxable
concerning the assertion arise, and the language of the statute reads "or
concern of Congress
the
that
submitted
is
It
170.
at
year." See note 7 supra. See also 547 F.2d
damages,
substantial
for
liable
be
may
who
taxpayers
on
burden
the
alleviate
to
solely
was
McLane
&
Poirier
with
occurred
as
Frequently,
occurred.
regardless of how long ago the facts
time this case
Corporation, such liabilities prove devastating to the corporate entity. By the
F.2d at 162, n. 1. It is
came before the Tax Court, Poirier & McLane had gone bankrupt. 547
would serve
further submitted that mere notice of the existence of the trust to the claimants
that such a
felt
is
it
if
alternative,
burdensome
less
a
be
would
and
the purpose of Congress
safeguard is needed.
86. 547 F.2d at 166.
87. Id. at 165.
88. United States v. Consolidated Edison, 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
89. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
90. Id.
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discussed above,' the new regulation has not achieved the sanctity
of law and, further, as the taxpayer claimed from the start,9" the
regulation arguably requires more than the statute and consequently unreasonably limits the rights of many parties who would
otherwise fall within its terms.
Judge Mansfield, writing for the dissent in the court of appeals,
followed this reasoning. In response to the majority's theory he
stated:
The majority, in denying deductibility on the ground that the
claimants did not sign the trust instrument, acts on the basis of
newly-devised theories as to Congress' intent which find no support
in the language, purpose, or legislative history of § 461(f). Indeed, not
one of the ten-member panel of the Tax Court (either of the majority
or the minority) and no party to this litigation, has even suggested
or endorsed the reasoning or theory advanced by the majority. The
reason for this is plain-the theory is contrary to the plain language
and purpose of the statute. 3
Note should be taken of the fact that the majority conceded
that in this case the peititioner had clearly placed the funds beyond
its control. The dissent noted that this is the prime concern of
Congress"5 and that the additional requirement that the party asserting the liability also be a party to the trust "adds a condition
and restriction not contemplated by Congress and not reasonably
necessary to accomplish Congress' purpose."96
Policy arguments were also presented by the dissent which
rebut the majority's claims. The dissent noted that rather than
assuring that the sum placed in trust (or escrow)97 would be reasonable, the requirement that the person asserting the liability by a
party to the trust would result in deductions being taken by the
defendant in an amount equivalent to the highest possible degree
of liability. "[N]o litigating claimant would agree to a lesser
amount [being held in trust] for fear of an uncollectable judgment
91. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
92. Brief for Petitioner at 67.
93. 547 F.2d at 167-68.
94. 547 F.2d at 166, n. 10.
95. 547 F.2d at 169, citing S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100, reprinted in
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1773.
96. 547 F.2d at 171, citing Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1882); Miller v. United States,
294 U.S. 435 (1934); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936); Manhattan General Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
97. The dissent argues that the majority tries to differentiate between a trust and an
escrow agreement. Although the point is made that for all practical purposes here in question
they are legally equivalent, the point is unnecessary because it is not an important factor
in
the majority's decision.
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or of prejudicing his litigation position or possible settlement oi his
claim." 8 This is precisely the argument presented on behalf of the
taxpayer in the Tax Court. 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 13, 1977, thereby
allowing the regulation to stand. A fact situation similar to the one
here in question which could legitimately rechallenge the validity
of Treasury Regulation 1.461-2(c)(1) may never occur. Rather than
argue with the courts again and waste any tax benefit gained by
utilizing section 461(f) on litigation costs, most taxpayers will follow
the letter of the regulation.
The arguments for relitigation are strong. Of the thirteen judges
who heard the case, a majority of seven felt that either the regulation was invalid or should be narrowly construed so as not to require
the party asserting the liability to be a party to the trust agreement. 0 0 Clearly the beneficiaries' rights are protected under univer0
sal rules of trust law. The remaining six judges, ' although a minority of all of those who heard the case, controlled the outcome and
held the regulation valid as a proper method of furthering the intent
of Congress.
The view of the controlling minority is weak. More attention
must be given to the confusing and conflicting doctrines promul03
°
gated by Chestnut Securities,' Consolidated Edison I,1 the
0 4 and Consolidated Edison II.1"1 The
Anderson "all events test,"'
reconciliation and understanding of these cases has not yet received
adequate treatment by the courts or legal writers. It is submitted
that proper analysis will reveal congressional intent that section
461(f) be much more broadly applied than the present restriction of
Regulation 1.461-2(c)(1) allows. The tax benefit to the party utilizing section 461(f) is clear, and the overall effect on the generation
of revenue is negligible.'0 If the money is paid in settlement or if it
98. 547 F.2d at 170.
99. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
100. This includes six judges on the Tax Court panel and the dissent in the Second
Circuit.
101. This includes the four dissenting judges on the Tax Court and the majority on the
three-judge Circuit Court.
102. Chestnut Sec. Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 574 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
103. Consolidated Edison v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 881 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
104. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
105. United States v. Consolidated Edison, 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
106. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 101, reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1774.
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is returned to the settlor, the government will ultimately receive its
share.107 The Treasury is charged with the protection of government
revenue, but in this case they were overly zealous and wasteful of
their energies in prosecuting this case to its unfortunate conclusion.
Thomas G. Reid
107. It must be conceded that the time value of money and cash flow considerations
are often persuasive arguments on either side of the issue of deferred taxes, but despite this,
Congress was willing to allow the taxpayer this benefit. In addition, the Senate Committee
report noted that § 461(f) would have a negligible effect on overall revenue. Id. at 1912.
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